Equal Partners, Though Not Of Equal Strength The Military Diplomacy of General Charles Foulkes and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by Michael W. Manulak
Canadian Military History
Volume 18 | Issue 2 Article 3
3-27-2015
Equal Partners, Though Not Of Equal Strength The
Military Diplomacy of General Charles Foulkes
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Michael W. Manulak
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military
History by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.
Recommended Citation
Michael W. Manulak (2009) "Equal Partners, Though Not Of Equal Strength The Military Diplomacy of General Charles Foulkes and
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," Canadian Military History: Vol. 18: Iss. 2, Article 3.
Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol18/iss2/3
15
Equal Partners, Though
Not Of Equal Strength
The Military Diplomacy of General Charles Foulkes 
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Michael W. Manulak
Students of Canadian foreign policy learn extensively of the pioneering 
role politicians and diplomats like 
Louis St. Laurent, Lester Pearson, and 
Hume Wrong played in realizing the 
North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949. 
There is a large literature that tells 
the story of an inﬂuential Canadian 
diplomacy that coaxed a reluctant 
US government toward supporting 
European security. Perhaps because 
military ofﬁcials are often less inclined 
to publish memoirs, the military side 
of the negotiations has not received 
similar historical treatment. One 
aspect of Canada’s role in forging 
the alliance that has been largely 
ignored is the military diplomacy of 
the Department of National Defence 
(DND) and, particularly, chief of the 
general staff, Lieutenant-General 
Charles Foulkes. 
 This article will examine Foulkes’ 
military diplomacy from 1949-1951, 
as he sought to ensure representation 
in allied decision-making when 
Canadian resources were deployed 
by NATO. The alliance in this period 
had two distinct developmental 
stages, necessitating two separate 
approaches to alliance representation. 
The ﬁrst stage, occurring before the 
North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) military 
structure was finalized, saw the 
dissemination of the “Foulkes Plan,” 
NATO’s first structural planning 
document. By taking the initiative 
in organizational planning, Foulkes 
sought to institutionalize a privileged 
position for Canada within the 
new alliance. The second stage, 
occurring once the alliance structure 
was finalized, included the early 
operations of the NATO Military 
Committee and the related “Canadian 
proposal” for alliance reorganization. 
At this stage, Foulkes observed that, 
in practice, NATO military affairs 
tilted heavily toward US–UK–French 
dominance. As a result, Foulkes 
reoriented his strategy toward 
empowering the NATO Military 
Committee as the primary means of 
ensuring Canadian representation. 
Foulkes’ efforts, pragmatic rather 
than visionary, signiﬁcantly shaped 
the alliance.
 Foulkes served as Canadian 
chief of the general staff (CGS) from 
1945-51 and then as chair of the chiefs 
of staff committee from 1951-60. 
According to J.L. Granatstein, Foulkes 
was the “only military politician 
with the ability and clout to deal on 
even terms with the public service 
mandarins.”1 Viewed as “dour, short, 
cold, but very shrewd,” Foulkes 
ascended the ranks during the Second 
World War with particular support 
from General H.D.G. Crerar.2 He 
was appointed chief of the general 
staff in 1945 primarily because of 
his bureaucratic ability and his 
suitable understanding of the role 
of the military in postwar society.3 
Having served as commander of the 
I Canadian Corps during the war and 
then as CGS, by 1948 Foulkes had 
cultivated close relationships with his 
British and American counterparts.4 
 The NATO treaty was signed 
in Washington on 4 April 1949. 
Abstract: Much has been written about the 
leading role of diplomats Lester Pearson, 
Hume Wrong, and Escott Reid in forging 
the North Atlantic Treaty in 1948-1949. 
Regrettably, much less attention has been 
devoted in the literature to the equally 
important contributions of Lieutenant-
General Charles Foulkes, then Canada’s 
chief of the general staff, to the alliance 
military structure. This essay charts 
Foulkes’ military diplomacy through two 
distinct stages. The ﬁrst stage saw the 
dissemination of the “Foulkes Plan”, 
the alliance’s first structural planning 
document. The second stage was deﬁned 
by Foulkes’ efforts to ensure Canadian 
representation by empowering the NATO 
Military Committee. Through pragmatic 
diplomacy, focused on Canadian interests, 
Foulkes made a considerable contribution 
to NATO’s military organization and 
operations.
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The signatories included Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal,  the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. 
At the time of ratification, NATO 
countries were profoundly concerned 
about the strategic imbalance in 
Europe. It was estimated that NATO 
could muster about 14 active divisions 
compared to a projected 175 Soviet 
divisions. Although it was generally 
assumed the Soviet Union  would not 
risk open war, it did aid communist 
forces indirectly and through armed 
intimidation. An American general 
was reported to have mused that all 
the Soviets needed was “some good 
pairs of boots” to conquer Western 
Europe.5 This caused great alarm 
and strengthened western resolve to 
contain further Soviet expansion. As 
a result, NATO’s primary objective 
was to provide an effective and 
credible deterrent. The effectiveness 
of this deterrent would be achieved 
by augmenting NATO’s military 
capacity to respond to the Soviet 
threat. The credibility of the deterrent 
would be enhanced by creating an 
organizational structure capable of 
coordinating its multinational forces. 
It was believed that these measures 
would boost European conﬁdence 
and invigorate their defence efforts. 
All of these ends could be met 
by establishing an organization 
capable of managing rearmament 
and military planning. This task 
was complicated by the signiﬁcant 
diversity of interests represented 
among the membership of the new 
alliance.
 The text of the NAT, complete 
by March 1949, was largely silent 
on questions of alliance structure. 
Article 9 spoke vaguely of an allied 
council and defence committee. On 
2 April 1949, allied foreign ministers 
agreed to postpone formal discussion 
of structure until the treaty had been 
signed and ratiﬁed.6 For the US, UK, 
Canada, and France, this pause in 
negotiations would allow them to 
reach agreement on an acceptable 
organization before an alliance-wide 
working group convened to consider 
the matter formally in preparation for 
the September 1949 meeting of the 
NATO foreign ministers. 
 Canadian considerations of the 
NATO military organization were 
conditioned by memories of the 
wartime US-UK Combined Chiefs of 
Staff, which conducted the war with 
minimal consultation. The wartime 
Supreme Commander of the Allied 
Expeditionary Force was appointed in 
1944 without any consultation with, 
or formal delegation of authority 
from, the Canadian government. 
Since 1946, however, Canada had 
participated in a secret trilateral 
“ABC” strategic planning forum with 
the United States and Britain which 
gave Canadians access to high level 
planning and intelligence. Therefore, 
Canadian ofﬁcials in the Department 
of National Defence believed that it 
was in Canada’s interest to prevent 
a return to the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff and to ensure an arrangement 
similar to the ABC forum. This 
was considered to be particularly 
important when decisions were 
taken about the nature and extent of 
Canadian contributions to NATO. 
 To meet these interests, General 
Foulkes developed a plan for the 
NAT defence organization. In March 
1949, he circulated a “purely personal 
paper” proposing a structure for the 
alliance to Major-General Alfred 
Gruenther (US Director of the 
Combined Staff) in Washington and 
Major-General Sir Leslie Hollis (UK 
Chief Staff Ofﬁcer to the Minister of 
Defence) in London. The primary 
basis of the “Foulkes Plan” was 
a series of interlocking “Regional 
Planning Groups” (RPGs), which 
were designed to ensure a degree 
of regional autonomy and initiative 
in coordinating allied defences. 
Countries that did not contribute to 
the defence of a given region would 
not have representation. This ensured 
that the groups were small, efﬁcient, 
and most importantly, relatively 
secure from Soviet espionage. As a 
means of aggregating this regional 
planning into a broader strategic 
concept, Foulkes proposed a Supreme 
Commander or Combined Chiefs 
committee. Although he preferred 
a Supreme Commander, Foulkes 
recognized that a Combined Chiefs 
body might be more politically 
acceptable. A final element of his 
plan was the “Strategic Reserve 
Group” (SRG), composed only of the 
countries likely to have uncommitted 
reserves of personnel and materials for 
continental Europe: the United States, 
General Charles Foulkes, chief of the 
general staff, played an important 
behind-the-scenes role to ensure 
Canada’s voice at NATO.
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of structure until the treaty had been 
signed and ratiﬁed.6 For the US, UK, 
Canada, and France, this pause in 
negotiations would allow them to 
reach agreement on an acceptable 
organization before an alliance-wide 
working group convened to consider 
the matter formally in preparation for 
the September 1949 meeting of the 
NATO foreign ministers. 
 Canadian considerations of the 
NATO military organization were 
conditioned by memories of the 
wartime US-UK Combined Chiefs of 
Staff, which conducted the war with 
minimal consultation. The wartime 
Supreme Commander of the Allied 
Expeditionary Force was appointed in 
1944 without any consultation with, 
or formal delegation of authority 
from, the Canadian government. 
Since 1946, however, Canada had 
participated in a secret trilateral 
“ABC” strategic planning forum with 
the United States and Britain which 
gave Canadians access to high level 
planning and intelligence. Therefore, 
Canadian ofﬁcials in the Department 
of National Defence believed that it 
was in Canada’s interest to prevent 
a return to the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff and to ensure an arrangement 
similar to the ABC forum. This 
was considered to be particularly 
important when decisions were 
taken about the nature and extent of 
Canadian contributions to NATO. 
 To meet these interests, General 
Foulkes developed a plan for the 
NAT defence organization. In March 
1949, he circulated a “purely personal 
paper” proposing a structure for the 
alliance to Major-General Alfred 
Gruenther (US Director of the 
Combined Staff) in Washington and 
Major-General Sir Leslie Hollis (UK 
Chief Staff Ofﬁcer to the Minister of 
Defence) in London. The primary 
basis of the “Foulkes Plan” was 
a series of interlocking “Regional 
Planning Groups” (RPGs), which 
were designed to ensure a degree 
of regional autonomy and initiative 
in coordinating allied defences. 
Countries that did not contribute to 
the defence of a given region would 
not have representation. This ensured 
that the groups were small, efﬁcient, 
and most importantly, relatively 
secure from Soviet espionage. As a 
means of aggregating this regional 
planning into a broader strategic 
concept, Foulkes proposed a Supreme 
Commander or Combined Chiefs 
committee. Although he preferred 
a Supreme Commander, Foulkes 
recognized that a Combined Chiefs 
body might be more politically 
acceptable. A final element of his 
plan was the “Strategic Reserve 
Group” (SRG), composed only of the 
countries likely to have uncommitted 
reserves of personnel and materials for 
continental Europe: the United States, 
Britain, and Canada. The Strategic 
Reserve Group would collaborate 
with the Supreme Commander or 
NATO Combined Chiefs to deploy 
its forces with a view to broader 
strategic imperatives.7 All of these 
bodies would function under the 
Defence Committee, described in 
article 9 of the NAT.
 Foulkes’ plan provided an 
efficient means of mobilizing the 
deterrent and protecting Canadian 
interests. By giving the Europeans 
responsibility for their own defence 
through the RPGs, Canada would 
also be under less pressure to send 
troops to Europe in peacetime. 
Foulkes recognized that this would 
be politically important because the 
Canadian public and its government 
were unlikely to support such a 
deployment. The SRG would prevent 
a return to the old Combined Chiefs 
of Staff, institutionalize Canada’s 
privileged planning role within the 
new alliance, and ensure that Canada 
was able to determine the nature and 
extent of its contribution to North 
Atlantic defence. 
 On 24 March, General Hollis 
met with Lieutenant-Colonel R.L. 
Raymont,  the Canadian Joint 
Liaison Ofﬁcer in London, to discuss 
Foulkes’ memo. While welcoming the 
Canadian initiative, Hollis conveyed 
profound reservations about the 
regional basis of the plan. Hollis had 
envisioned a structure predicated 
on Western European defence and 
thought that a regional framework 
would dilute NATO’s European 
focus by implying an equal emphasis 
on Scandinavian and North American 
security. His concern that this could 
provide an avenue for a return to 
North American isolationism was 
reinforced by the fact that Foulkes did 
not envision Canadian membership 
in the Western European RPG. Under 
the proposed structure, argued Hollis, 
General Charles Foulkes, chief of the 
general staff, played an important 
behind-the-scenes role to ensure 
Canada’s voice at NATO.
Lester B. Pearson (left, with hand on chin), W.L. Mackenzie King (at head of the 
table) and Charles Foulkes (to the right of King) confer at the NATO conference.
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Canada would offer little more than 
“good wishes” to European defence.8 
In addition, Hollis contended that 
a Supreme Commander would be 
politically unacceptable and that the 
Strategic Reserve Group would imply 
further detachment from European 
defence. In the case of the Supreme 
Commander, Hollis suggested that 
a Combined Chiefs composed of the 
US, UK, and Canada should carry out 
strategic direction “on the lines of the 
present ABC set up.”
 T h e  Br i t i s h  presented  an 
alternative vision to American 
planners. After exploring means 
of ensuring US-UK dominance of 
strategic planning,9 the UK Joint 
Services Mission composed a plan 
which sought to graft the NAT 
military organization onto the 
nascent Western Union Defence 
Organization. The British plan 
allowed for only two committees: 
a Western European committee 
composed of the US, Canada, and 
the signatories of the Brussels Pact;10 
and an Atlantic Ocean subcommittee 
limited to the US, UK, Canada, and 
France. Representatives from the 
other NATO countries would be 
consulted only when necessary.11 The 
proposal also advocated a Combined 
Chief “Steering Committee,” which 
would be limited to 
the US, UK, Canada, 
and France.  The 
Steering Committee 
was to be located 
in London, which 
would allow the high-level Canadian 
and American representatives on 
the NATO committee to sit as 
observers on the Western Union 
Defence Organization. This overlap 
of representation would ensure that 
“the decisions of the Western Union 
Chiefs of Staff would be automatically 
ratiﬁed by the Atlantic Pact Chiefs of 
Staff.”12
 Undeterred, Foulkes went to 
Washington in April 1949 to discuss 
his proposal with US officials. 
Although he found that US military 
planners were still in the preliminary 
stages of their consideration of the 
matter, Foulkes was pleased to ﬁnd 
that his paper had been reproduced 
and circulated to various Pentagon 
directors for comment. He discovered 
that it had made a very favourable 
impression. General Omar Bradley, 
the US Army chief of staff, argued that 
the proposed regional arrangements 
“were the only ones which would 
be workable in the Atlantic Pact.” 
Regarding the British proposal, 
Bradley “did not favour any further 
extension of US responsibility within 
the Western Union.” The Americans 
also appeared much more amenable 
than the British to the idea of having 
a NATO Supreme Commander. 
In fact, General Gruenther went 
so far as to suggest that former 
Supreme Commander of the Allied 
Forces in Europe, US General Dwight 
Eisenhower, might be “drafted” 
to  head the al l iance mil i tary 
organization. In the event that a 
Combined Chiefs organization was 
formed, US ofﬁcials favoured a US-
UK-Canada-France membership.13
 Although his SRG concept seemed 
to have little traction, most elements 
of Foulkes’ plan now appeared to 
stand a good chance of being adopted. 
On 19 April, Foulkes summarized the 
results of his Washington meetings: 
“From these conversations I am left 
with the opinion that the…principles 
which are contained in the Canadian 
paper will most likely be accepted 
as a basis for setting-up a military 
organization… If these principles are 
accepted it would appear to satisfy 
the Canadian interests.” Without 
his planned SRG, Foulkes turned 
his attention to finding a way of 
formalizing Canada’s privileged ABC 
planning position within NATO – 
“it will still be necessary to form 
some kind of vehicle in which the 
present strategic planning of UK 
US and Canada can be continued 
without creating an atmosphere 
which will be injurious to the proper 
development of territorial defence in 
each region.”14 British and American 
support for Canadian participation on 
an allied Combined Chiefs “Steering 
Committee” was a promising means 
of ensuring representation when 
planning occurred with implications 
for Canadian resources.
 Foulkes’ optimism was quickly 
tempered by developments in 
External Affairs. The reports ﬂowing 
from Foulkes’ pen, particularly those 
concerning Canadian participation 
on an allied military Steering 
Committee, caused Undersecretary 
of State for External Affairs Arnold 
Heeney to worry that Canada would 
be overwhlemed with military 
commitments: 
It would clearly be inappropriate 
and unwise for us to take a leading 
part in putting forward proposals for 
the form that defence organization 
might take under the Atlantic 
Treaty. It could indeed prove very 
embarrassing if we were to insist 
on any given scheme for our own 
representation and then find that 
we seriously disagreed with the 
criteria proposed by other countries 
for apportioning the burden in men, 
money or supplies.15
Left: Signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, 
Washington DC, 4 April 1949.
Below: External Affairs minister Lester 
Pearson signs the NATO Treaty for 
Canada.
External Affairs and National Defence 
had different viewpoints on the role 
Canada should play in NATO. Here Lester 
Pearson and Arnold Heeney sit in a NATO 
Council meeting. General Foulkes is 
visible in the second row (with his arms 
crossed). 
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extension of US responsibility within 
the Western Union.” The Americans 
also appeared much more amenable 
than the British to the idea of having 
a NATO Supreme Commander. 
In fact, General Gruenther went 
so far as to suggest that former 
Supreme Commander of the Allied 
Forces in Europe, US General Dwight 
Eisenhower, might be “drafted” 
to  head the al l iance mil i tary 
organization. In the event that a 
Combined Chiefs organization was 
formed, US ofﬁcials favoured a US-
UK-Canada-France membership.13
 Although his SRG concept seemed 
to have little traction, most elements 
of Foulkes’ plan now appeared to 
stand a good chance of being adopted. 
On 19 April, Foulkes summarized the 
results of his Washington meetings: 
“From these conversations I am left 
with the opinion that the…principles 
which are contained in the Canadian 
paper will most likely be accepted 
as a basis for setting-up a military 
organization… If these principles are 
accepted it would appear to satisfy 
the Canadian interests.” Without 
his planned SRG, Foulkes turned 
his attention to finding a way of 
formalizing Canada’s privileged ABC 
planning position within NATO – 
“it will still be necessary to form 
some kind of vehicle in which the 
present strategic planning of UK 
US and Canada can be continued 
without creating an atmosphere 
which will be injurious to the proper 
development of territorial defence in 
each region.”14 British and American 
support for Canadian participation on 
an allied Combined Chiefs “Steering 
Committee” was a promising means 
of ensuring representation when 
planning occurred with implications 
for Canadian resources.
 Foulkes’ optimism was quickly 
tempered by developments in 
External Affairs. The reports ﬂowing 
from Foulkes’ pen, particularly those 
concerning Canadian participation 
on an allied military Steering 
Committee, caused Undersecretary 
of State for External Affairs Arnold 
Heeney to worry that Canada would 
be overwhlemed with military 
commitments: 
It would clearly be inappropriate 
and unwise for us to take a leading 
part in putting forward proposals for 
the form that defence organization 
might take under the Atlantic 
Treaty. It could indeed prove very 
embarrassing if we were to insist 
on any given scheme for our own 
representation and then find that 
we seriously disagreed with the 
criteria proposed by other countries 
for apportioning the burden in men, 
money or supplies.15
Probably still hearing the cautious 
echoes of retired Prime Minister 
William Lyon Mackenzie King 
in the halls of the East Block of 
the Parliament buildings, Heeney 
warned that a position on the Steering 
Committee might entail a contribution 
of personnel and materials consistent 
with that position. Heeney’s concerns 
may also have been inﬂuenced by the 
knowledge that Ottawa would soon 
be considering its contributions to 
European mutual aid. 
 On 12 May 1949 the Cabinet 
Defence Committee met in Ottawa 
to discuss the matter. Foulkes 
argued that Canada should push 
for a role on the Standing Group, 
since “planning…would inevitably 
involve the use of Canadian troops 
and Canadian facilities and the Chiefs 
of Staff considered that Canada 
should be represented on the senior 
planning body.” Secretary of State 
for External Affairs Lester Pearson, 
fresh from a brieﬁng with Heeney, 
argued that Canada should seek 
representation only “when matters of 
direct concern to Canada were being 
discussed.” The cabinet concluded 
that “Canada should not actively 
seek representation on the senior 
military body,” but would accept 
an invitation if offered.16 Canadian 
ambassador in Washington Hume 
Wrong immediately met with John 
D. Hickerson, the US Assistant 
Secretary of State for United Nations 
Affairs, to communicate this policy. 
The same day, Heeney sought to 
disarm Foulkes by insisting that 
talks on the military organization 
should be conducted exclusively by 
the Embassy in Washington, rather 
than by Foulkes and his staff.17 
Canadian membership on the Steering 
Committee, however, continued to 
appear in British proposals as late as 
July 1949.18 Perhaps alarmed by this 
prospect, Wrong again raised the 
question that August with George 
Perkins, US Assistant Secretary 
of State for European Affairs, and 
restated the Canadian policy.19 
 On 23 June the US Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (JCS) ﬁnally completed its 
own set of recommendations on the 
NATO military organization. The 
Left: Signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, 
Washington DC, 4 April 1949.
Below: External Affairs minister Lester 
Pearson signs the NATO Treaty for 
Canada.
External Affairs and National Defence 
had different viewpoints on the role 
Canada should play in NATO. Here Lester 
Pearson and Arnold Heeney sit in a NATO 
Council meeting. General Foulkes is 
visible in the second row (with his arms 
crossed). 
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plan supported Foulkes’ regional 
concept and reinforced the emerging 
consensus on the need for a Steering 
Group. The JCS, which wanted to 
keep the committee small, took 
the view that a maximum of three 
countries should be included as 
Steering Group members in their 
August Working Group proposals. 
These three would be the US, UK, 
and France. The JCS also proposed 
a “Military Advisory Council,” 
composed of the chiefs of staff of all 
NATO countries. 
 In  August  1949  the  Jo in t 
Chiefs toured Western Europe to 
ascertain the views of allied military 
authorities. The meetings produced 
general agreement on the alliance 
organization, with a few exceptions. 
The most important disagreement 
arose over the composition of the 
Steering Committee, with Italy 
demanding membership, and France 
and Norway advocating a Canadian 
seat on the committee.20 Canadian 
membership was also advocated “for 
political reasons” by the US State 
Department, but blocked by the JCS, 
which insisted that the committee 
should be no larger than three.21 
 With general agreement on 
the allied military structure, the 
NATO Working Group conferred 
in Washington on 22 August 1949. 
Canada was represented by its 
Washington Embassy counsellor 
George  Ignat ie f f  and,  in  the 
background, by Ambassador Hume 
Wrong. The primary Canadian 
objective at the meetings was to 
advance a consultative formula 
ensuring that non-Steering Committee 
countries would have representation 
on the committee when items of 
“direct concern” were discussed. 
This formula, originally suggested 
by Pearson, sought to prevent the use 
of Canadian troops without adequate 
consultation.22 For Foulkes, this 
provision would principally protect 
Canadian interests since Canada was 
likely to be the only non-Steering 
Committee ally that would contribute 
troops outside of its region. 
 The Canadian negotiators were 
shocked to learn that the JCS was 
“somewhat perturbed” by the 
Canadian representation formula 
and reluctant to grant it.23 Pearson 
instructed Ignatieff to demonstrate 
that this was a “minimum Canadian 
requirement,” implying that Canada 
would reconsider its participation in 
the alliance if the formula was not 
approved. Pearson even contemplated 
a personal visit to Washington to 
“stand ﬁrm on this no matter what 
the Chiefs of Staff think.”24 Although 
the JCS eventually assented to the 
Canadian consultative formula, it 
would come to mean little, as the big 
three interpreted the provision very 
loosely.
 The Foulkes Plan outlined 
what, in effect, became the military 
organization of NATO.25 The basis 
for the alliance structure approved 
in October 1949 was the Regional 
Planning Groups, the ostensible 
centre of regional planning and allied 
defence. The Standing Group (the 
new, more acceptable, nomenclature 
for the Steering Committee), with 
Britain, France and the United States 
as members, would be in continuous 
session to convert the work of 
the RPGs into a broader strategic 
concept.  The Standing Group, 
which embodied the Combined 
Chiefs committee concept proposed 
by Foulkes, came to represent an 
executive group for the alliance. 
As suggested by the JCS, a Military 
Committee was formed at the chiefs 
of staff level with representation 
for all allies. As a means of liaison 
between the Standing Group and 
the smaller powers, “Accredited 
Representatives” were appointed in 
Washington to coordinate the work of 
the Military Committee and Standing 
Group.
 With the alliance forged and its 
structure ﬁnalized in October 1949, 
Foulkes turned his attention to the 
protection of Canadian interests 
by guaranteeing a seat at the table 
when important decisions involving 
the use of troops and resources 
were made. He soon discovered, 
however, that this objective ran 
counter to NATO’s inclination 
toward Standing Group supremacy. 
Although technically subordinate to 
the Military Committee, the Standing 
Group was always intended to be 
an “executive committee” in which 
key allies would “limit the real work 
of the Military Committee,” so as to 
create an alliance structure “more in 
accordance with the realities of the 
situation.”26 Aside from presenting an 
obstacle to Foulkes’ representational 
objectives, this arrangement caused 
considerable embarrassment when 
the Standing Group sought to hector 
its smaller allies into supporting 
proposals without sufficient time 
to secure instructions from their 
governments. Foulkes, always aware 
of Ottawa’s political climate, soon 
found this arrangement intolerable. 
 The Standing Group’s actions 
n e c e s s i t a t e d  a  f u n d a m e n t a l 
reorientation of Canada’s alliance 
interests toward strengthening the 
position of the Military Committee 
to ensure that the “overall direction 
of the alliance must be carried on by 
the alliance as a whole, an alliance 
in which we were all equal partners, 
though not of equal strength.”27 The 
Military Committee, however, had 
important structural weaknesses, 
as defence expert Douglas Bland 
argues. It only met annually; its 
chair rotated, detracting from any 
sustained leadership; it had no 
staff or secretariat; and, it had an 
extremely broad mandate, which 
obscured its role.28 Furthermore, 
the urgency of European defence 
allowed the Standing Group to cite its 
own relative efﬁciency and security 
as a justification for withholding 
information and avoiding genuine 
consultation with the Military 
Committee. 
 As a means of overcoming the 
Military Committee’s structural 
weaknesses, Foulkes and defence 
minister Brooke Claxton came to work 
closely with NATO’s non-Standing 
Group members to ensure genuine 
consultation. Aside from shared 
interests, Foulkes found that support 
for curbing the Standing Group’s 
authority was ripened by a sense 
that a problem existed with allied 
operations. In particular, the tactics 
employed by the Standing Group 
to secure adoption of the Medium 
Term Defence Plan in March 1950 
left a very sour taste in the mouths 
of the allies.29 The plan, calling 
for 90 NATO divisions in Europe 
by 1954, was widely dismissed as 
unrealistic and contributed to a 
feeling of hopelessness in the alliance. 
As Claxton remembers, this sense of 
grievance and discontent provided 
an opportunity  for  Canadian 
leadership:
Somewhat naturally, we came to 
be regarded as a leader among the 
smaller powers. At almost every 
meeting of the Defence Ministers 
several of the lesser powers would 
discuss privately with members of the 
Canadian team some high-handed 
action of the Standing Group…they 
would urge us to be their spokesman 
in taking some stand or asserting 
some point of view vis-à-vis the 
Standing Group powers...30
The emerging consensus among the 
non-Standing Group members about 
the need for better representation 
grew into a virtual bloc within alliance 
circles and enabled Foulkes’ push for 
greater military consultation.
 A primary means of achieving this 
objective was to strengthen the role 
of the Accredited Representatives to 
First Meeting of Council Deputies, 
London, 25 July 1950.
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protection of Canadian interests 
by guaranteeing a seat at the table 
when important decisions involving 
the use of troops and resources 
were made. He soon discovered, 
however, that this objective ran 
counter to NATO’s inclination 
toward Standing Group supremacy. 
Although technically subordinate to 
the Military Committee, the Standing 
Group was always intended to be 
an “executive committee” in which 
key allies would “limit the real work 
of the Military Committee,” so as to 
create an alliance structure “more in 
accordance with the realities of the 
situation.”26 Aside from presenting an 
obstacle to Foulkes’ representational 
objectives, this arrangement caused 
considerable embarrassment when 
the Standing Group sought to hector 
its smaller allies into supporting 
proposals without sufficient time 
to secure instructions from their 
governments. Foulkes, always aware 
of Ottawa’s political climate, soon 
found this arrangement intolerable. 
 The Standing Group’s actions 
n e c e s s i t a t e d  a  f u n d a m e n t a l 
reorientation of Canada’s alliance 
interests toward strengthening the 
position of the Military Committee 
to ensure that the “overall direction 
of the alliance must be carried on by 
the alliance as a whole, an alliance 
in which we were all equal partners, 
though not of equal strength.”27 The 
Military Committee, however, had 
important structural weaknesses, 
as defence expert Douglas Bland 
argues. It only met annually; its 
chair rotated, detracting from any 
sustained leadership; it had no 
staff or secretariat; and, it had an 
extremely broad mandate, which 
obscured its role.28 Furthermore, 
the urgency of European defence 
allowed the Standing Group to cite its 
own relative efﬁciency and security 
as a justification for withholding 
information and avoiding genuine 
consultation with the Military 
Committee. 
 As a means of overcoming the 
Military Committee’s structural 
weaknesses, Foulkes and defence 
minister Brooke Claxton came to work 
closely with NATO’s non-Standing 
Group members to ensure genuine 
consultation. Aside from shared 
interests, Foulkes found that support 
for curbing the Standing Group’s 
authority was ripened by a sense 
that a problem existed with allied 
operations. In particular, the tactics 
employed by the Standing Group 
to secure adoption of the Medium 
Term Defence Plan in March 1950 
left a very sour taste in the mouths 
of the allies.29 The plan, calling 
for 90 NATO divisions in Europe 
by 1954, was widely dismissed as 
unrealistic and contributed to a 
feeling of hopelessness in the alliance. 
As Claxton remembers, this sense of 
grievance and discontent provided 
an opportunity  for  Canadian 
leadership:
Somewhat naturally, we came to 
be regarded as a leader among the 
smaller powers. At almost every 
meeting of the Defence Ministers 
several of the lesser powers would 
discuss privately with members of the 
Canadian team some high-handed 
action of the Standing Group…they 
would urge us to be their spokesman 
in taking some stand or asserting 
some point of view vis-à-vis the 
Standing Group powers...30
The emerging consensus among the 
non-Standing Group members about 
the need for better representation 
grew into a virtual bloc within alliance 
circles and enabled Foulkes’ push for 
greater military consultation.
 A primary means of achieving this 
objective was to strengthen the role 
of the Accredited Representatives to 
facilitate constructive liaison between 
the Military Committee and the 
Standing Group. At the ﬁrst session 
of the Military Committee in October 
1949, Foulkes called on the Standing 
Group to furnish the Accredited 
Representatives with an agenda prior 
to meetings so that these countries 
could be adequately prepared for 
what was to be discussed. This was 
agreed.31 At the second Military 
Committee session in December 1949, 
Foulkes requested that the Accredited 
Representatives be consulted before 
the dissemination of strategic guidance 
papers to the RPGs. This suggestion 
ran into considerable resistance 
from the Standing Group countries, 
which emphasized the urgency of 
these measures. Foulkes stood ﬁrm, 
insisting that he had been told that 
the Accredited Representatives 
would actively consult with the 
Standing Group. They would not 
be insigniﬁcant “paper boys.” The 
committee acceded to Foulkes’ 
suggestion.32 Two days later at the 
NATO Defence Committee meeting, 
the defence ministers from Norway 
and Denmark made their acceptance 
of the “Review of Progress” paper 
conditional on the Standing Group 
compliance with the consultative 
procedure outlined by Foulkes.33 
 In the lead up to the October 
1950 NATO Defence and Military 
Committee meetings,  Claxton 
and Foulkes advanced a plan that 
would convert the Accredited 
Representatives into the Military 
Committee in permanent session, 
not dissimilar from the newly formed 
North Atlantic Council “Deputies.”34 
At the fourth Military Committee 
meeting of that session, Foulkes raised 
Claxton’s proposals for deepening 
the responsibilities of the Accredited 
Representatives. He argued that the 
representatives should take part in 
the discussion and formulation of 
military policy, beyond their current 
liaison role. He requested that the 
representatives be provided with 
papers and agendas sufficiently 
in advance to secure feedback and 
represent their home governments. 
 Foulkes’ efforts led to a proposal 
that the Military Committee convert 
the Accredited Representatives into a 
Military Representatives Committee 
to fulﬁll this consultative mandate.35 
US General Omar Bradley, reminding 
the committee of the efficiency of 
the Standing Group, stated his 
interpretation of the character of 
consultation. He suggested “after 
any paper has been prepared, it 
will be presented to the Committee 
First Meeting of Council Deputies, 
London, 25 July 1950.
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of Deputies before it is distributed 
to the nations of NATO.” Foulkes 
countered “when a paper was being 
prepared the deputies would be 
called in and told that the Standing 
Group was preparing a paper on 
the following subject. That would 
give an opportunity for national 
views to be discussed before the 
paper is produced.” Foulkes further 
requested that non-Standing Group 
members be included in the working 
parties and secretariats, which 
served the Standing Group. This 
proposal was adopted.36 The Military 
Representatives Committee was 
formally established at the joint 
session of the North Atlantic Council 
and Defence Committee in December 
1950. The Military Representatives 
Committee contributed to providing 
a greater multilateral base within the 
alliance by facilitating continuous 
contact among the members of the 
Military Committee and with the 
Standing Group.
 Foulkes’ campaign to strengthen 
the funct ions of  the Mil i tary 
Committee continued at the December 
1950 session when discussion turned 
to the responsibilities associated with 
the leadership of the committee. 
The chair of the Military Committee 
was determined on an annual basis 
by the representatives of each 
NATO country, rotating in English 
alphabetical order. This arrangement 
was ineffective because non-Standing 
Group chairs did not have access 
to the papers necessary to advance 
the agenda. As a result, meetings 
with a non-Standing Group chair 
were generally unproductive.37 
As a means of overcoming these 
difﬁculties, Belgian General Etienne 
Baele requested the assignment of 
his personal staff to consult with the 
Standing Group prior to assuming the 
Military Committee chair. General 
Baele’s request was interrupted by 
British Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, 
who sought to delay consideration of 
this proposal. 
 Foulkes reinforced Baele’s 
position by suggesting that the staff 
of a non-Standing Group chair should 
sit as an observer in Standing Group 
meetings and establish a link with the 
Standing Group chair in the months 
preceding their chairpersonship. 
Upon agreement from the Committee, 
General Léchères of France suggested 
that the committee avoid committing 
this arrangement to paper. The 
Canadian responded by reminding 
the committee:
We have had promises by the 
Standing Group which have not been 
kept before. I have had a promise 
from the Chairman of the Standing 
Group that they would provide 
papers and agendas. There has been 
no action…It is all right to say that 
we consult further, but if we take 
last year’s practice you will recall 
that our representatives were only 
called in for discussions four times in 
the whole year. You will also recall 
that we got papers the day we came 
into the meeting…I am sure that we 
must at least get a written record 
for the Standing Group about the 
arrangements when a non member 
becomes Chairman. I am vitally 
concerned in this.38
The Canadian and Belgian position 
was supported by most of the smaller 
countries and forced Slessor to 
note that “special arrangements” 
ought to be made to allow a non-
Standing Group chair to fulfill its 
responsibilities more effectively.
 The creation of the Military 
Representatives Committee, which 
became the Military Committee in 
Permanent Session several years 
later, and the “special arrangements” 
for non-Standing Group chair 
consultation, contributed to an 
erosion of the early supremacy of 
the Standing Group powers. Claxton 
recalls in his memoirs:
At one particular time one of the 
members of the permanent council 
stated that non-Standing Group 
nations had delegated the control 
of their military affairs to the three 
major powers. It was this kind of 
assumption that brought about 
the establishment of the Military 
Representatives Committee, but 
the establishment of this committee 
was only to come in consequence of 
repeated pressure by us; for in this 
as in so much else in NATO, Canada 
took the initiative.39
The Mil i tary  Representat ives 
Committee allowed NATO’s smaller 
allies to address matters that, until 
then, would have had to wait for a 
session of the Military Committee. 
The Canadian contribution to this 
structural development strengthened 
the hand of the Military Committee 
through greater consultative measures 
and the establishment of the Military 
Representatives Committee. 
Lieutenant-General Foulkes meets 
with General Dwight D. Eisenhower in 
Ottawa on 26 January 1946. Eisenhower 
was to become NATO’s ﬁrst Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) 
in 1950. 
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The chair of the Military Committee 
was determined on an annual basis 
by the representatives of each 
NATO country, rotating in English 
alphabetical order. This arrangement 
was ineffective because non-Standing 
Group chairs did not have access 
to the papers necessary to advance 
the agenda. As a result, meetings 
with a non-Standing Group chair 
were generally unproductive.37 
As a means of overcoming these 
difﬁculties, Belgian General Etienne 
Baele requested the assignment of 
his personal staff to consult with the 
Standing Group prior to assuming the 
Military Committee chair. General 
Baele’s request was interrupted by 
British Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, 
who sought to delay consideration of 
this proposal. 
 Foulkes reinforced Baele’s 
position by suggesting that the staff 
of a non-Standing Group chair should 
sit as an observer in Standing Group 
meetings and establish a link with the 
Standing Group chair in the months 
preceding their chairpersonship. 
Upon agreement from the Committee, 
General Léchères of France suggested 
that the committee avoid committing 
this arrangement to paper. The 
Canadian responded by reminding 
the committee:
We have had promises by the 
Standing Group which have not been 
kept before. I have had a promise 
from the Chairman of the Standing 
Group that they would provide 
papers and agendas. There has been 
no action…It is all right to say that 
we consult further, but if we take 
last year’s practice you will recall 
that our representatives were only 
called in for discussions four times in 
the whole year. You will also recall 
that we got papers the day we came 
into the meeting…I am sure that we 
must at least get a written record 
for the Standing Group about the 
arrangements when a non member 
becomes Chairman. I am vitally 
concerned in this.38
The Canadian and Belgian position 
was supported by most of the smaller 
countries and forced Slessor to 
note that “special arrangements” 
ought to be made to allow a non-
Standing Group chair to fulfill its 
responsibilities more effectively.
 The creation of the Military 
Representatives Committee, which 
became the Military Committee in 
Permanent Session several years 
later, and the “special arrangements” 
for non-Standing Group chair 
consultation, contributed to an 
erosion of the early supremacy of 
the Standing Group powers. Claxton 
recalls in his memoirs:
At one particular time one of the 
members of the permanent council 
stated that non-Standing Group 
nations had delegated the control 
of their military affairs to the three 
major powers. It was this kind of 
assumption that brought about 
the establishment of the Military 
Representatives Committee, but 
the establishment of this committee 
was only to come in consequence of 
repeated pressure by us; for in this 
as in so much else in NATO, Canada 
took the initiative.39
The Mil i tary  Representat ives 
Committee allowed NATO’s smaller 
allies to address matters that, until 
then, would have had to wait for a 
session of the Military Committee. 
The Canadian contribution to this 
structural development strengthened 
the hand of the Military Committee 
through greater consultative measures 
and the establishment of the Military 
Representatives Committee. 
 As a further means of ensuring that 
decisions were taken “by the alliance 
as a whole” Foulkes collaborated 
closely with the Department of 
External Affairs to draft a proposal 
for the reorganization of NATO. The 
“Canadian proposal,” ﬁrst broached 
at the North Atlantic Council in 
September 1950, recommended 
the creation of one “government 
level” council to replace the three 
autonomous foreign, defence, and 
finance ministerial committees. 
Although the proposal was primarily 
pursued through the NATO Council of 
Deputies (composed of representatives 
from allied foreign ministries), 
i ts  consideration necessitated 
collaboration with the respective 
national military authorities. The 
proposed reorganization came to 
be tied conceptually to the issue 
of greater alliance control of the 
Standing Group. Recognizing the 
opportunity, Foulkes touted the 
proposal as a means of improving 
consultation by empowering greater 
political oversight of NATO military 
operations by a body on which all 
allies were represented. 
 An initial paper, composed by 
Arnold Heeney, was forwarded to 
NATO member governments on 17 
November 1950. The draft’s political 
aspects generated broad support on 
the Council of Deputies, particularly 
its proposed amalgamation of 
all NATO activities “under one 
Supreme Council which would 
represent Governments” and its 
enhancement of the Council Deputies 
as “the active continuing authority 
of the NATO.”40 The draft’s military 
paragraphs, however, inadvertently 
caused “alarm and despondency” in 
military circles because they did not 
take into account the creation of the 
Military Representatives Committee 
and they suggested that the NATO 
Military Committee be reconstituted 
as an advisory body of the Standing 
Group.41 Moreover, the proposed 
subordination of the Standing Group 
to the Council Deputies generated 
consternation within the US, UK, 
and French militaries. After a heated 
debate on the proposal’s military 
dimensions ensued on 12 December, 
the proposal was held back by 
Canadian officials at US request 
until measures for the formation of 
SHAPE and the integration of German 
forces were further advanced. In the 
intervening period, Foulkes redrafted 
the proposal’s military section to 
bring it “into line” with emerging 
alliance military imperatives. 
 The amended Canadian plan 
incorporating Foulkes’ revisions was 
circulated to allied governments in 
January 1951. On the contentious 
relationship between the Deputies 
and the Standing Group, Foulkes 
proposed compromise language, 
suggesting that the Standing Group 
“would be guided on political matters 
by the [North Atlantic] Council, and 
when Council is not in session by 
the Council Deputies.” In addition, 
the Council Deputies would obtain 
“military guidance” from NATO 
military authorities. Instead of 
making the Military Committee an 
advisory body of the Standing Group, 
Foulkes proposed the conversion 
of the Military Committee into a 
“Defence Committee” in permanent 
session.42 In all but name, the newly 
constituted committee would create 
the Military Committee in permanent 
session that Foulkes had advocated 
in October 1950. If adopted, the plan 
would enhance greatly the position 
of NATO’s smaller powers vis-à-vis 
the Standing Group, even beyond 
that envisioned by the creation 
of the Military Representatives 
Committee.
 Foulkes also worked to build 
support for the proposal among 
his counterparts.  To this end, 
he continued to place particular 
emphasis on the non-Standing Group 
countries, since “the smaller nations 
still look to Canada to take the lead.”43 
At the Council of Deputies meetings 
Lieutenant-General Foulkes meets 
with General Dwight D. Eisenhower in 
Ottawa on 26 January 1946. Eisenhower 
was to become NATO’s ﬁrst Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) 
in 1950. 
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in January 1951, the Canadian 
proposal generated support from 
the Dutch and Norwegian deputies, 
who endorsed the principle of the 
Council of Deputy’s primacy over 
the Standing Group.44 This position 
encountered stiff resistance from 
the British representative.45 The US 
representative, Charles Spofford, on 
the other hand, “said very little” on 
the Council, except to his “express 
personal view” of support for 
positions which had reached virtual 
consensus.46 Spofford’s hands (and 
the Council’s) were tied until the 
US State and Defense Departments 
reached ﬁnal agreement on the US 
position. 
 In February 1951, Foulkes visited 
Washington to discuss the matter with 
General Bradley. Bradley opposed 
the notion of extending the Military 
Committee to serve in permanent 
session, appealing instead to the new 
Military Representatives Committee 
“to see whether this arrangement 
was to be satisfactory.”47 On the 
relationship between the Standing 
Group and the Council Deputies, 
the JCS proposed that the deputies 
“shall provide the Standing Group 
with political guidance upon which 
strategic decisions should be based. 
The Standing Group shall maintain 
close liaison with the Council Deputies 
and provide that body with advice on 
military matters.”48 This position, 
which incorporated the essential 
elements of the Canadian proposal, 
represented a signiﬁcant compromise 
by the JCS and was obtained only 
after considerable discussion with 
the State Department. The vocal 
appeals of NATO’s “smaller nations” 
featured prevalently in necessitating 
this compromise. Recognizing the 
value of the proposed text, the 
Canadian representative conveyed 
Canada’s willingness to accept the 
proposed text at the 9 April 1951 
deputies meeting. NATO’s other 
members soon followed.
 The “Canadian proposal” was 
approved by the North Atlantic 
Counci l  on  3  May 1951 .  The 
concessions obtained contributed 
to greater oversight of the Standing 
Group by the Council Deputies, 
where Canada had representation. 
Just as importantly, the increasingly 
assertive and concerted views 
of NATO’s non-Standing Group 
powers made the practice of overt 
military control by the big three allies 
untenable. Although the proposed 
extension of the Military Committee 
into permanent session was dropped 
in the face of JCS opposition, it 
brought the item onto the alliance’s 
decision agenda and contributed 
to its adoption in 1958. On the 
political side, the proposal merged 
the work of the three committees 
into a reconstituted North Atlantic 
Council, which would act as “the sole 
ministerial body in the Organization,” 
charged with “the responsibility of 
considering all matters concerning the 
implementation of the provisions of 
the Treaty.” The role of the Council of 
Deputies was also enhanced to become 
“the permanent working organization 
of the North Atlantic Council.”49 This 
is essentially the position of the 
NATO Permanent Representatives 
today. Accompanying the growth 
in the role of the Council Deputies, 
an international secretariat was 
established to facilitate the work of the 
council. These institutional changes 
were an important antecedent to the 
measures adopted at the 1952 Lisbon 
Conference, which established a 
North Atlantic Council in permanent 
session and NATO’s ﬁrst Secretary 
General.
 In period from 1949-1951, General 
Foulkes sought to protect and project 
Canadian interests by establishing a 
system within NATO that guaranteed 
Canada representation in alliance 
affairs. Foulkes’ military diplomacy 
took two distinct forms. In the period 
before the alliance structure was 
finalized, he took the initiative in 
allied organization planning to 
propose a structure which included 
a privileged planning position for 
the Canadian military. Once the 
organization was formalized and 
began to operate, Foulkes undertook 
a campaign to strengthen the Military 
Committee through increased 
consultation and political oversight 
by “the alliance as a whole.” These 
efforts, motivated primarily by a 
desire to protect Canadian interests, 
left a distinct mark on NATO. 
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brought the item onto the alliance’s 
decision agenda and contributed 
to its adoption in 1958. On the 
political side, the proposal merged 
the work of the three committees 
into a reconstituted North Atlantic 
Council, which would act as “the sole 
ministerial body in the Organization,” 
charged with “the responsibility of 
considering all matters concerning the 
implementation of the provisions of 
the Treaty.” The role of the Council of 
Deputies was also enhanced to become 
“the permanent working organization 
of the North Atlantic Council.”49 This 
is essentially the position of the 
NATO Permanent Representatives 
today. Accompanying the growth 
in the role of the Council Deputies, 
an international secretariat was 
established to facilitate the work of the 
council. These institutional changes 
were an important antecedent to the 
measures adopted at the 1952 Lisbon 
Conference, which established a 
North Atlantic Council in permanent 
session and NATO’s ﬁrst Secretary 
General.
 In period from 1949-1951, General 
Foulkes sought to protect and project 
Canadian interests by establishing a 
system within NATO that guaranteed 
Canada representation in alliance 
affairs. Foulkes’ military diplomacy 
took two distinct forms. In the period 
before the alliance structure was 
finalized, he took the initiative in 
allied organization planning to 
propose a structure which included 
a privileged planning position for 
the Canadian military. Once the 
organization was formalized and 
began to operate, Foulkes undertook 
a campaign to strengthen the Military 
Committee through increased 
consultation and political oversight 
by “the alliance as a whole.” These 
efforts, motivated primarily by a 
desire to protect Canadian interests, 
left a distinct mark on NATO. 
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